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Fair Trade Laws and Other Minimum Price Laws
Under the Defense Production Act Amendments
of 1952
By ABRAHAM C. WEmom °u*
The Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, approved
June 30, 1952, provided for the addition of a new subsection to
section 402 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended,'
to read as follows:
(1) No rule, regulation, order, or amendment thereto issued
under this title [Title IV of the Defense Production Act of
1950, as amended] shall fix a ceiling on the price paid or
received on the sale or delivery of any material in any State
below the minimum sales price of such material fixed by the
State law (other than any so-called 'fair trade law') now in
effect, or by regulation issued pursuant to such law.
This provision is commonly referred to as the Bricker Amend-
ment.' By delegations of authority from the President, the Office
of Price Stabilization (OPS) became charged with the duty of
establishing ceiling prices on commodities.3 One of the important
questions arising in the interpretation of the Bricker Amendment
is as to the difference between a "so-called fair trade law" to
which ceiling prices of the OPS need not yield and a State mini-
mum price law "other than a so-called fair trade law," to which
OPS ceiling prices must yield. Another question relates to which
regulations issued by State administrative agencies pursuant to
State laws supersede OPS regulations establishing ceiling prices.
0 J.D. 1920, University of Vienna; LL.B. 1926, Columbia University; Solici-
tor's Office, U. S. Department of Agriculture; formerly Branch Counsel, Office of
Price Stabilization. The views expressed here are those of the writer and are not
to be construed as those of the Office of Price Stabilization or U. S. Department
of Agriculture.
'STAT. 296, 300; 504 U.S.C.A. App. 2102(1) (Supp. 1953).
2 Introduced in a slightly different form on May 9, 1952, by Senator Hendrick-
son as an amendment to S. 2645, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. "Intended to be proposed
by Mr. Bricker."
a Sec. 402, 64 Stat. 798,803; 50 U.S.C. App. 2102; Ex. Order 10161, 15 F.R.
6105 (1950); Economic Stabilization Agency General Order No. 2, 16 F.R. 788(1951).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On February 5, 1952, Senator Maybank introduced S. 2594 to
extend the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. On
February 11, 1952, Senator Maybank introduced S. 2645 as the
"Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952," to amend and
extend the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and the
Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended. On May 9, 1952,
Senator Hendrickson submitted an amendment to S. 2645, "In-
tended to be proposed by Mr. Bricker," to add a subsection to
section 402 of the Defense Production Act of 1952, as amended,
to read as follows:
(1) No rule, regulation, order, or amendment thereto issued
under this title shall fix a ceiling on the price paid or re-
ceived on the sale or delivery of any material in any State
below the minimum sales price of such material fixed by the
State law or regulation now or hereafter in effect.4
On May 27, 1952, the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency reported S. 2594, including in it the above amendment in
modified form as section 105 of the reported bill. In the amend-
ment as modified, the part following "State law" read: "(other
than any so-called 'fair trade law') or regulation now in effect."5
With reference to that amendment, the Committee stated:0
ADJUSTMENT OF CEILINGS TO STATE
MINIMUM SALE PRICES (SEC. 105).
Prior to the passage of the Defense Production
Act some States had enacted and enforced minimum price
laws on some commodities. Ceiling price regulations inter-
fere with the enforcement of some of these laws because
Federal regulations prevail in event of conflict with State
laws.
This new subsection, therefore, provides that
ceiling prices for materials sold or delivered in any State
shall not be below the minimum prices of such materials
as fixed by that State's minimum price law which is now in
effect. General so-called fair trade laws have been excepted
from this amendment. Under this new provision the Presi-
dent shall adjust ceiling prices in a given State to make them
Note 2, supra.
'S. Rep. No. 1529, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 34-35 (May 27, 1952).
0 Ibid. 26-27.
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not less than the level of prices established by such State's
minimum price laws where it is shown that the ceilings are
less than the minimum price level.
The House Committee on Banking and Currency, acting on
a parallel bill on June 16, 1952, included the same proposed sec-
tion 402(1) in section 108 of its version of the bill.7 The Commit-
tee's report contained a statement very similar to that in the
Senate Report."
Another version of the bill, as amended in the House of
Representatives on June 26, 1952," substituted, for the part after
"State law" in the amendment previously quoted from S. 2645,
the following: "(other than any so-called fair trade law) enacted
prior to July 1, 1952, or by regulation issued pursuant to such
law."
The Conference Report referred to differences in the language
used in the Senate and House versions, stated what language was
finally adopted, and generally expressed the intent of the con-
ferees.'0
H. R. Rep. No. 2177, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (June 16, 1952).
'Id. at 26. "STATE MINIMUM PRICES. The committee's attention has been
directed to some cases where ceiling-price regulations interfere with the enforce-
ment of State minimum-price laws. The amendment contained in section 108,
therefore, provides that ceiling prices for materials sold or delivered in any State
shall not be below the minimum prices of such materials as fixed by that State's
minimum price law or regulation which is now in effect. Fair-trade laws have
been excepted from the operation of this amendment. Under this amendment
where it is shown that the ceilings are less than the minimum price level in effect
in a State the President must adjust ceiling prices to make them conform to the
provisions of the amendment."
82d Cong., 2d Sess., S. 2594, p. 28, In the House of Representatives, June
26, 1952.
"H. R. Rep. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (June 28, 1952). "STATE
MINIMUM PRICES. The Senate bill contained a provision which would add a
new subsection (1) to section 402 of the act under which no price ceiling for
any material could be set in any State below the minimum sales price of such
material fixed "by the State law (other than any so-called 'fair trade law') or
regulation now in effect." The House amendment contained a generally similar
provision which, however, in place of the language included in the above quota-
tion marks would substitute "by any State law other than any so-called fair-trade
law enacted prior to July 1, 1952 or by regulation issued pursuant to such law."
The conference substitute retains the provision but in place of the quoted lan-
guage above substitutes "by the State law (other than any so-called 'fair trade
law'? now in effect, or by regulation issued pursuant to such law."
"It was the intent of the conferees that this provision apply only to State
minimum price laws which are presently enforced and in effect, and not to State
minimum price laws which are not now enforced or which are dormant."
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SO-CALLED FAIR TRADE LAWS AND MINIMUM PRICE
LAWS OTHER THAN SO-CALLED FAIR TRADE LAWS
The legislative history does not shed any light on the line of
demarcation between a so-called fair trade law and a minimum
price law other than a so-called fair trade law. Obviously, how-
ever, the Congressional committees had in mind a group of State
laws which fixed minimum sales prices and divided that group
into so-called fair trade laws and other laws. Since minimum
prices fixed pursuant to State fair trade laws were to continue
subordinated to ceiling prices determined by the OPS, while
minimum prices determined pursuant to other State laws were t6
supersede OPS ceiling prices, it is important to draw the line
between these statutes as clearly as possible.
When the Bricker Amendment became law there existed sev-
eral types of State price control statutes, and Congress presum-
ably legislated with reference to them. An attempt will be made
here to describe the main types and some variations of those
types.11
1. Statutes prohibiting sales below cost. Thirty States have
statutes prohibiting sales below cost.12 These statutes usually de-'
fine the term "cost", including therein the "cost of doing business"
which is expressed in percentages of the manufacturing cost in
the case of a manufacturer, and of the invoice cost in the case of a
retailer or wholesaler. There are also sales below cost statutes
dealing with specific commodities like cigarettes, 13 liquor, 4 or
drugs." At times, these provisions require the inclusion in the
minimum price of a specified percentage as a mark-up, in addition
"This article is not based on an exhaustive study of all State statutes in this
field, but the views here expressed may be helpful in forming an opinion as to a
type or variation not here discussed. Consideration will be given to some State
statutes which were held unconstitutional by State courts prior to July 1, 1952,
and for that reason, as will appear hereinafter under "Administration of the
Bricker Amendment," are not covered by the Amendment. Such a statute may be
used as an illustration because this very kind of statute may have been held con-
stitutional in another State or may not have been tested in the courts of other
States.
' See Commerce Clearing House, 2 Trade Regulation Service 7503.
'In about 14 States, for instance, Ark. Stat. 1947, 1951 Supp., sees. 70-601
to 70-613; 1935 Colo. Stat. 1950 Supp., ch. 48, sees. 302(14) to 302(27).
"For instance, N.M. Stat. see. 63-911 (1941).
For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 960 (1939); La. Gen. St. Ann. sec.
8316.1 (Dart 1939).
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to cost.'0 These statutes expressly prohibit selling for less than
certain prices, and the prices are computed in accordance with
specified formulas. Therefore, these statutes are clearly minimum
price laws. Whether they are minimum price laws other than
fair trade laws will appear from the discussion of fair trade laws.
2. Statutes fixing, or providing for fixing of, dollar-and-cent
minimum prices. Legislatures have fixed dollar-and-cent prices
or dollar-and-cent minimum prices for some commodities and
services, or have authorized State administrative bodies to do so.
This form of price control has been applied to milk and other
dairy products, foodstuffs, agricultural commodities, citrus, coal
and fuel, and to services like barbering and cleaning and dyeing.'7
Minimum differentials have been established for grades of butter-
fat.'
The question may arise as to whether a dollar-and-cent price
is a minimum price. It can be argued that when a definite price
is fixed for a commodity, that commodity may not be sold for
less and, therefore, a definite price is a minimum price. On the
other hand, a definite price is not only a minimum price but also
a maximum price, and Congress referred only to minimum prices
in section 402(1) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended. I incline to the view that a State law requiring definite
prices should be considered a law requiring minimum prices for
the purpose of the Bricker Amendment and that, therefore, OPS
ceiling prices should yield to definite prices fixed by a State law.
This view seems to me closer to the Congressional intent.
All these statutes discussed under "2" are minimum price laws.
Whether they are minimum price laws other than fair trade laws
will appear from the discussion of fair trade laws.
3. Permissive Fair Trade Acts. Fair trade acts provide "in
substance that a contract for the sale of a trademarked, trade-
named, or branded commodity which is in fair and open com-
petition with other commodities of the same general class shall
not be deemed in violation of law by reason of restrictions therein
" For instance, Act 360 of La. Laws of 1988, held unconstitutional in
Schwegmann Brothers v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216 La.
148, 43 So. 2d 248 (1949).
17 For a collection of such statutes, see Works Progress Administration, State
Price Control Legislation (1940) 385-502.
8 Id. at 551.
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upon the resale of such commodity at a price other than that fixed
by the producer or vendor; ... The avowed object of such legis-
lation is the protection of trademark owners, distributors, and the
public against injurious and uneconomic practices in the distribu-
tion of articles of standard quality under a distinguishing trade-
mark, brand, or tradename. . ."-'9 The statutes dealt with here are
permissive; the producer or vendor may or may not enter into the
contract which is protected by the statute. But for the fair trade
act, the contract would generally be considered illegal as in re-
straint of trade. The object of fair trade acts is generally referred
to as "resale price maintenance", and the acts are generally dis-
cussed under this heading. Fair trade acts permit vertical price
regulation while sales below cost statutes provide for the control
of prices along horizontal lines.20
These statutes are generally known as fair trade acts and un-
questionably fall within the category of "any so-called fair trade
law" mentioned in the Bricker Amendment. The result is that
OPS ceiling prices do not yield to prices specified in contracts pro-
tected by such statutes.
Of the 45 States which have fair trade acts,2 some have the
so-called old type act and some have a more elaborate new type
act which is a model proposed by the National Association of Re-
tail Druggists. One of the differences is that the old type act
deals with contracts which fix the price at which the buyer is per-
mitted to resell while the new type deals with contracts providing
that the buyer will not resell at less than the price stipulated by
the seller.2 Some fair trade acts require fair trade contracts to
contain provisions for minimum mark-ups in their resale prices.23
1952 Am. Jur., Trademarks, Tradenames, and Trade Practices sec. 177.
,vertical price control refers to price restrictions applicable to different
planes of the marketing process, such as a restriction imposed by manufacturers on
retailers, while horizontal price control refers to price restrictions applicable to
sellers on the same plane, for example, a price agreement between manufacturers
or between retailers.' Works Progress Administration, State Price Control Legisla-
tion (1940) XLVIII, n. 1.
Commerce Clearing House, 2 Trade Regulation Service 7502.
' For statutes of both types see 5 Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition
and Trademarks 2245-2249 (2 ed. 1950).
For instance, the Kentucky Distilled Spirits and Wine Fair Trade Act, Ky.
Acts, 1940, c. 13, p. 90; Ky. Rev. Stat. secs. 244.380, 244.390 (1948). This
statute was held constitutional in Reeves v. Simons, 289 Ky. 793, 160 S.W. 2d 149
(1942). A substantially similar statute, Fla. Acts 1941, c. 21001, was held un-
constitutional in Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co. 150 Fla. 772, 8 So. 2d
920 (1942) revg. on reh. 150 Fla. 754, 8 So. 2d 913 (1942).
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A comparison of the permissive fair trade acts on one hand
and the minimum price statutes discussed -under "1" and "2" on
the other, indicates some distinctions between them. (a) Fair
trade acts refer to trademarked, tradenamed, or branded com-
modities while those minimum price statutes refer to commodities
irrespective of whether they are trademarked, tradenamed, or
branded. (b) Fair trade statutes state expressly that they cover
commodities which are in fair and open competition with other
commodities of the same general class. The minimum price
statutes discussed under "1" and "2" do not contain such state-
ments. But those of them that deal with specific commodities
like cigarettes, liquor, or drugs in fact deal with commodities
which are in competition with others of the same general class.
Therefore, applicability to commodities which are in competition
with others of the same general class is not a distinguishing
feature between these two groups of statutes. (c) Fair trade
statutes let private individuals determine minimum sales prices
while, by the statutes discussed under "1" and "2", the Legisla-
tures determine prices or price formulas or leave determinations
to State authorities. Consequently, a fair trade act helps maintain
a minimum price level only after the owner of the brand has
acted, has made a contract, while a minimum price statute
described under "1" or "2" maintains a minimum price level with-
out the need of any action by a private individual. (d) The con-
trol pursuant to a fair trade act is vertical (though if substantially
all buyers are subject to it the effect may become horizontal)
while control pursuant to those minimum price statutes is not
vertical but is horizontal.
4. Compulsory Fair Trade Acts. Some statutes prohibit the
sale of liquor in containers which bear labels stating the brand
or name of the owner or producer except pursuant to a fair trade
contract. -4 Others delegate discretion to State officials to prohibit
sales of liquor except according to fair trade contracts.25 With
"For instance, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 48, secs. 196-204 (1947), held unconstitu-
tional in Illinois Liquor Control Commission v. Chicago's Last Liquor Store, 403
IlM. 578, 88 N.E. 2d 15 (1949). This statute required the filing of the contract
with the Liquor Control Commission as well as the filing of a schedule of consumer
minimum resale prices.
' For instance, N. J. Laws 1938, c. 208, sec. 1, p. 492; N. J. Rev. Stat. 1937,
1938 Annual, 83:1-23.1; and rule 6 of Regulation 30 of the N. J. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control. This statute was held constitutional in Caine v.
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reference to the four features discussed in the preceding para-
graph, these statutes are like the permissive fair trade laws and
clearly fall within the category of "any so-called fair trade laws"
which do not receive the protection of the Bricker Amendment.
5. Statutes against price discrimination. These statutes pro-
hibit discrimination between persons and localities in respect of
the price of commodities.26 Since they do not directly or indirectly
fix minimum prices they need not be considered in connection
with interpreting the Bricker Amendment.
6. Summary and attempt to distinguish between the two
groups. The -statutes so far discussed, generally cover the field
of State price control from which Congress carved out the two
groups of statutes mentioned in the Bricker Amendment. Those
discussed under "8" and "4" are unquestionably fair trade acts
within the meaning of the Amendment. Those discussed under
"1" and "2" are minimum price laws which differ from the fair
trade acts in three important respects, as to coverage of branded
articles, as to determination of prices by State authorities or pri-
vate individuals, and as to vertical or horizontal control. Under
these circumstances, it seems reasonable to consider the statutes
discussed under "8" and "4" as the "so-called 'fair trade laws'"
mentioned in the Bricker Amendment, the statutes discussed
under "1" and "2" as minimum price laws other than so-called
fair trade laws, and the three distinguishing features as general
guides, helpful in placing a particular statute in one or the other
group.
7. The Connecticut Liquor Price Posting Act. In 1951, Con-
necticut passed an Act Concerning the Posting of Prices of
Alcoholic Liquors.27 Section 1 of this statute was incorporated in
the Connecticut General Statutes as section 904b under a heading,
"Fair trade; schedule of prices to be filed with commission". This
section forbids an out-of-state shipper, manufacturer, or whole-
Burnett, 122 N. J. L. 39, 4 A 2d 37 (1939) aff'd on op. below 123 N. J. L. 317,
8 A 2d 604 (1939). A similar statutory provision, paragraph 12(b) of sec. 17
of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, 3 McKinney's N. Y. Cons.
Laws (Edward Thompson Co. 1946) was held unconstitutional in Levine v.
O'Connell, 275 App. Div. (1st Dept.) 217, 88 NYS 2d 672 (1949) affd without
op. 300 N. Y. 658, 91 N.E. 2d 322 (1950). See note, "State Power to Regulate
Price of Intoxicating Liquor", 14 A.L.R. 699, 701 (1950).
52 Am. Jut., Trademarks, Tradenames, and Trade Practices sec. 175.
'Conn. Acts. 1951, No. 200, p. 205; Conn. Stat. sees. 904b to 906b (Supp.
1951).
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saler permittee to sell any alcoholic liquor, the container of which
bears a label stating the brand or the name of the owner or pro-
ducer, unless a schedule of minimum consumer resale prices for
each brand of alcoholic liquor has been filed with the Liquor
Control Commission, except that written permission for such sale
may be granted by the Commission for good cause shown. Such
schedule is to be filed by the out-of-state shipper, manufacturer,
or wholesaler who owns the brand if licensed by the Commission,
or a wholesaler who is appointed agent for that purpose, or any
wholesaler with the approval of the Commission if the owner of
the brand fails to act. The prices remain in effect for a period
fixed by the Commission, not to exceed four months. No permit-
tee authorized to sell alcoholic liquor at retail for off-premises
consumption shall sell at a price less than a minimum consumer
resale price then in effect, unless written permission of the Com-
mission is granted for good cause shown. Section 2, incorporated
as Section 905b in the Connecticut General Statutes, authorizes
the Commission to make regulations necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act; to permit changes in the schedules; to permit
the sale, at a price less than the minimum consumer resale price,
of damaged goods; and to permit the sale by a retailer of a brand
for which a schedule has not been and cannot be filed, in order
to avoid practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships.
In an attempt to determine whether this statute falls within
one or the other of the groups of statutes referred to in the Bricker
Amendment, the following should be considered: (a) When the
first section of the statute was incorporated in the Connecticut
General Statutes it was given a heading, "Fair trade". (b) In
Schwartz v. Kelley 8 a Connecticut court stated that by this act
the Legislature had chosen "to cope with certain aspects of liquor
control, through the medium of resale price maintenance at the
consumer level". The phrase "resale price maintenance" typically
describes the objective of fair trade laws. (c) This statute has all
the distinguishing features of fair trade acts, as stated under "6".
It refers to branded articles; the determination of minimum sales
prices is left to private individuals; and the statute's control is
vertical. Being compulsory, the statute is similar to a compulsory
' Commerce Clearing House, Trade Regulation Reporter, 1952 Trade Cases,
sec. 67,314 (Super. Ct. June 9, 1952).
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fair trade act. (d) The fact that the Connecticut law speaks of
"minimum consumer resale prices" is not a good argument against
considering it a fair trade law because Connecticut has a typical
fair trade law which also provides for "minimum consumer resale
prices" and "minimum prices."29 (e) It is proper to attribute to the
Congress an intention to give effect to minimum prices established
by State governments but not to minimum prices established by
private individuals. Under all these circumstances, I believe that
the Connecticut statute should be considered a fair trade law for
the purpose of the Bricker Amendment.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
On July 17, 1952, the Office of Price Stabilization issued Gen-
eral Overriding Regulation (GOR) 82 (17 F.R. 6538), entitled
"Adjustment of Ceiling Prices for Materials to the Minimum
Prices Fixed by State Laws". The issuance of this regulation was
based on the view that Congress did not intend the Bricker
Amendment to work automatically on the multitude of State
statutes covered by it but that Congress wished OPS to regulate
the application of the Amendment. This view was derived from
the legislative history.
The report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency30 stated that the President should adjust ceiling prices in a
given State to make them not less than the level of prices estab-
lished by such State's minimum price laws where it was shown
that the ceilings were less than the minimum price level. Ac-
cording to the Conference Report,31 "It was the intent of the con-
ferees that this provision apply only to State minimum price laws
which are presently enforced and in effect, and not to State
minimum price laws which are not now enforced or which are
dormant." Obviously, a selection had to be made between State
statutes which were and those which were not protected by the
Bricker Amendment.
In GOR 32, OPS required dealers or State authorities to apply,
submitting a certified copy of the applicable State law, a cer-
tificate that the law was enforced and in effect on June 30, 1952,
Conn. Gen. Stat. secs. 6711, 6709 (1949).
'Note 10, supra.
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and that it was currently in effect, and that the law had not been
held invalid by any decision of any court of competent jurisdic-
tion. Information was also required as to the minimum prices
computed in accordance with State law and the method of their
computation. Pursuant to GOR 32, a total of 13 special orders
was issued raising the ceiling prices to conform with State statutes
which prohibited sales, below cost, on the theory that such
statutes were minimum price laws within the contemplation of
the Bricker Amendment. Of these 13 orders, 12 dealt with prices
of cigarettes32 and one-for certain counties in Montana-with
breakfast cereals, lard, canned milk, oleomargarine, shortening,
and canned soupY3 One letter-order was issued on the applica-
tion of a Wisconsin dealer in smoking tobacco. OPS did not deny
any application received pursuant to GOR 32.
The question came up as to whether the Connecticut Liquor
Price Posting Act,34 was a fair trade law or a minimum price law
other than a fair trade law. OPS held that it was a fair trade law.
REGULATIONS ISSUED PURSUANT TO STATE LAWS
The Bricker Amendment subordinated OPS ceiling prices not
only to a certain kind of law, but also to regulations "issued
pursuant to such law". According to the Conference Report,3' the
amendment was to apply only to "State minimum price laws
which are presently enforced and in effect, and not to State
minimum price laws which are not now enforced or which are
dormant." The words "presently" and "now" obviously refer to
June 30, 1952, when the Bricker Amendment became law. The
question may arise as to whether OPS is bound by State regula-
Special Order 1 for Ohio, issued October 1, 1952, 17 F.R. 8789; Special
Order 2 for Maine, October 2, 1952, 17 F.R. 8847; Special Order 8 for Minnesota,
October 13, 1952, 17 F.R. 9102; Special Order 5 for New Jersey, October 13,
1952, 17 F.R. 9103; Special Order 6 for Wisconsin, October 13, 1952, 17 F.R.
9104; Special Order 7 for New Hampshire, October 15, 1952, 17 F.R. 9166;
Special Order 8 for Tennessee, October 27, 1952, 17 F.R. 9700; Special Order 9
for Kansas, November 13, 1952, 17 F.R. 10404; Special Order 10 for Pennsylvania,
December 1, 1952, 17 F.R. 10858; Special Order 11 for "out of stock" sales by
wholesale tobacco distributors in Montana, December 12, 1952, 17 F.R. 11332;
and Special Order 12 for Connecticut, February 2, 1953, 18 F.R. 720.
Special Order 4, issued October 13, 1952, 17 F.R. 9102, and Amendment 1,
December 29, 1952, 17 F. R. 11817.
Note 26, supra.
*' Note 10, supra.
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tions issued after June 30, 1952, pursuant to a law that was en-
forced and in effect on June 30, 1952.
It will be recalled from the legislative history that pursuant
to the original version of the Amendment, OPS ceiling prices
were to be subordinated to minimum sales prices fixed by any
"State law or regulation now or hereafter in effect."3" The Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency wished to subordinate them
only to any "State law . . . or regulation now in effect."37 The
House of Representatives desired to subordinate them to any law
"enacted prior to July 1, 1952, or regulation issued pursuant to
such law,"38 and this view was in effect accepted by the Con-
ference Report39 and became law. It thus appears that the effec-
tiveness of regulations issued after June 80, 1952, was clearly at
issue. Therefore, the statutory language as finally adopted should
be construed to mean exactly what it says. If the State law meets
the requirements of the Bricker Amendment, OPS ceiling prices
must be subordinated to regulations issued pursuant to such State'
law either before or after June 30, 1952.
This leaves a question open as to situations where State statutes
give State authorities discretion to determine minimum prices
according to broad and vague standards which do not enable a
member of the public to compute a minimum price, and on June
80, 1952, there were no minimum prices in effect which had been
determined by the State authorities. If the State authorities de-
termine minimum prices after June 30, 1952, I would take the
position that, generally speaking, OPS ceiling prices need not be
subordinated to such minimum prices because the State law,
though valid and on the statute books, had not been made
operative by June 80, 1952; it was in effect dormant on that date.
Of course, there may be variations in the provisions of those State
statutes, and an examination of the statute involved would have
to be made before a definite legal position could be taken in a
particular case.
Note 4, supra.
"Note 5, supra.
Note 9, supra.
Note 10, supra.
